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 ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a new class of measures of mobility as an equalizer of longer-
term incomes – a concept different from other notions such as mobility as time-
independence, positional movement, share movement, income flux, and directional 
income movement. A number of properties are specified leading to a class of indices, 
one easily-implementable member of which is applied to data for the United States and 
France. Using this index, income mobility is found to have equalized longer-term 
earnings among U.S. men in the 1970s but not in the 1980s or 1990s. In France, 
though, income mobility was equalizing throughout, and it has attained its maximum 
in the most recent period. 
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1.  The Notion of Income Mobility as an Equalizer of Longer-Term Incomes 
It has long been recognized that cross-sectional distributions of economic well-
being (hereafter referred to as "income") provide an incomplete and perhaps distorted 
picture of longer-term economic well-being. Slemrod (1992), for instance, has 
maintained that what he graphically calls "time-exposure income" gives a better picture 
of inequality than does "snapshot income." In any given year, people may have incomes 
which are transitorily high or low for reasons such as unemployment, illness, youth, good 
or bad luck, or exceptional economic events. As Joseph Schumpeter once put it, the 
distribution of incomes is like the rooms in a hotel – always full but not necessarily with 
the same people (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 126; cited in Sawhill and Condon, 1992). 
Economic mobility studies provide information about changes of people among rooms 
and changes in the rooms themselves.  
One of the primary motivations for economic mobility studies is to gauge the 
extent to which longer-term incomes are distributed more or less equally than are single-
year incomes. This perspective goes back to Milton Friedman (1962) who wrote: 
 
Consider two societies that have the same distribution of annual income.  
In one there is great mobility and change so that the position of particular 
families in the income hierarchy varies widely from year to year.  In the 
other, there is great rigidity so that each family stays in the same position 
year after year.  Clearly, in any meaningful sense, the second would be the 
more unequal society. 
More recent authors have argued similarly. For instance, Shorrocks (1978) has said: 
"Mobility is regarded as the degree to which equalization occurs as the period is 
extended. This view captures the prime importance of mobility for economists."  
Atkinson, Bourguignon, and Morrisson (1992) write in a similar vein: "One of the 
reasons why mobility is of interest is that it reduces inequality in the lifetime sum of 
earnings relative to that in a single period." Krugman (1992) states: "If income mobility 
were very high, the degree of inequality in any given year would be unimportant, because 
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the distribution of lifetime income would be very even . . . An increase in income 
mobility tends to make the distribution of lifetime income more equal." Jarvis and 
Jenkins (1998) put it thus: "To some people, greater inequality at a point in time is more 
tolerable if accompanied by significant mobility; mobility smoothes transitory variations 
in income so that 'permanent' inequality is less than observed inequality." Finally, 
Maasoumi (1998) has written, "Mobility should be of greater concern to policymakers 
and analysts than such other important concerns as inequality. . . What matters in this 
context is 'lifetime equity' rather than instantaneous equality."  
We thus have an old, clear, well-defined, ethically-relevant concept: income 
mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes. What we as empirical researchers would 
want to know in a given context is the extent to which the mobility that takes place works 
to equalize longer-term incomes relative to the base, disequalizes longer-term incomes 
relative to the base, or has no effect.  
Given this concept, we need a measure of it. Below, I review how the existing 
mobility measures treat such processes. Many measures treat other mobility concepts but 
not mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes. Two existing measures treat 
mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes but in different ways: Shorrocks (1978) 
by comparing the inequality of longer-term incomes relative to a weighted average of the 
inequalities of single-year incomes, not to the inequality of base-year incomes as is done 
here; and Chakravarty, Dutta, and Weymark (1985) by reaching the opposite ethical 
judgment from the one that I would want to draw.  
 
2.  Equalization or Disequalization of Longer-Term Incomes: Standard Mobility 
Measures and the Need for a New One  
2.1. Notation 
The following notation is used in what follows. Each individual, indexed by  
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i = 1, 2, . . . , n, receives an income in period t, t = 1, 2, . . . , T. Thus, a given situation 
y : = is an n x T matrix, where yi  = and yt : =  represent respectively 
the income profile of individual i and the snapshot distribution in period t. Define  
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notational convention of arraying income recipients in an arbitrary order in the base-year 
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2.2.  Why Equalizing Longer-Term Incomes Is Not the Same as Equalizing 
Single-Period Incomes 
 As has been noted by many authors going back at least as far as Friedman (1962), 
equalization of longer-term incomes is a fundamentally different concept from 
equalization of single-period incomes. The following simple example illustrates the 
difference. 
Suppose we draw samples of two persons from an economy in a base year and a 
final year and measure the incomes of each person in each of the two years. Let the 
distribution of income in the base year be y1' = (1, 3), and in the final year, y2' = (1, 5). In 
a very straightforward sense, it is clear that the movement from y1' to y2' has disequalized 
single-period incomes. 
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What about longer-term incomes? The two possible patterns of longitudinal 
income changes consistent with y1' →  y2' are 
I: (1, 3) → (1, 5) 
and 
II: (1, 3) → (5, 1). 
If  we take as our measure of longer-term income the average income of each individual 
over the period in question, as is used in much of the literature on the permanent income 
hypothesis of Friedman (1957), the distribution of longer-term incomes in Case I is  
YI’ = [1, 4], and in case II, it is YII’ = [3, 2]. 
A straightforward way of gauging whether the underlying mobility processes have 
equalized or disequalized the distribution of longer-term income in each case is to 
compare the inequality of YI and YII with the inequality of their common base year 
income distribution y1. Why y1? Because it is customary in economics to relate changes 
to the starting point, for example, in calculating economic growth rates, or more 
generally, in determining whether an economic magnitude has changed for the better or 
the worse.  For any reasonable concept of inequality,it is clear that YI is more unequal 
than y1 while YII is more equal than y1. Since both YI and YII are derived from the same 
initial vector of anonymous incomes y1' = (1, 3) and final vector of anonymous incomes 
y2' = (1, 5), it follows that changes in the inequality of single-period income give no 
information whatsoever about whether longer-term incomes are more equally distributed 
or less equally distributed than initial incomes. In this sense, the two are distinct 
concepts. 
 This example also makes clear why the literature on the redistributive impact of 
taxes and public expenditures (Lambert, 2001; Bénabou and Ok, 2001) does not offer 
guidance on how to measure the extent of equalization and disequalization of mobility 
processes. Both in the case of (1, 3) → (1, 5) and in the case of (1, 3) → (5, 1), period 2 
income is obviously more unequally distributed than period 1 income, but to say whether 
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mobility equalizes longer-term incomes vis-à-vis initial incomes or disequalizes them, we 
need to compare the joint distribution of period 1 and period 2 incomes with the 
distribution of period 1 incomes alone. By contrast, the literature on the equalizing 
impact of taxes involves comparing the post-tax distribution 2 with the pre-tax 
distribution 1. The difference between these two structures is the reason that the results 
from the literature on the redistributive effects of taxes cannot be borrowed and applied 
here. 
 
 2.3. Distinguishing Mobility when 'Gates gains' Compared with Mobility 
when 'Gates loses' 
Starting with a given vector of base-year incomes, suppose that all persons except 
one keep the same income as before. The one exception is the richest person in the 
economy (call him "Gates"), whose income rises by 50%:  (100, 200, 20000) → (100, 
200, 30000).  By any of the standard definitions of income inequality, this "Gates-gains" 
process increases inequality between period 1 and period 2, but that is not the issue raised 
by the authors quoted in the introduction. The issue is how to characterize the mobility 
that has taken place.  
What do the usual mobility measures say about this process? Many mobility 
measures in common use – including the trace of the quantile transition matrix, the 
coefficient of rank correlation, the mean number of absolute ranks changed, and many 
others – would record no mobility in this process. This is because these measures are all 
based on quantiles of an income transition matrix, none of which change as long as 
everyone maintains the same rank in the income distribution as before. What these 
measures measure is positional movement, and they rightly record that there is none of it 
in the Gates-gains process as long as Gates keeps his #1 position and all other incomes 
are unchanged. 
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What about other mobility concepts in the Gates-gains case? The various mobility 
concepts are discussed in Atkinson, Bourguignon, and Morrisson (1992), Maasoumi 
(1998), Fields and Ok (1999a), and Morgan (2005), among others, and are distinguished 
in Fields (2001, 2008). Time-dependence (measured, for example, by 1-r(y1, y2)) is said 
to be perfect (or equivalently, time-independence is said to be zero) if all final-year 
incomes are perfectly predictable from base-year incomes. But because this is not the 
case when Gates gains, we have a non-zero amount of time-independence. Share-
movement takes place if and only if some recipients' income shares change, which is 
clearly the case here; thus, an index of share movement such as (1/n) Σ |s(y2i) – s(y1i)|, 
where s(.) denotes i's share of total income, would be strictly positive. Non-directional 
income movement (also known as "income flux") arises whenever somebody's income 
fluctuates; that has happened here, as would be recorded, for example, by the Fields-Ok 
non-directional index (1/n) Σ |y2i – y1i|. Directional income-movement, gauged for 
example by the Fields-Ok directional index (1/n) Σ (log y2i – log y1i), is positive when 
someone experiences an income gain, which has also happened. And the quasi-Paretian 
approach to mobility as welfare change (viz., an increase in any income holding others 
constant is deemed to be welfare-improving) would judge that when Gates gains, the 
mobility that has taken place has raised welfare. Column (1) of Table 1 displays the 
changes in measures of each of these concepts when Gates gains. 
 While these various concepts, and the measures of them, tell us different things 
about the Gates-gains process, none indicates that the change (100, 200, 20000) →  
(100, 200, 30000) disequalizes longer-term incomes relative to the base. So if 
equalization of longer-term incomes is what we are interested in, the mobility concepts 
and measures just reviewed do not measure it.  
 Consider what would happen if, instead of Gates gaining 50%, Gates were to lose 
50%. Clearly, such a change should equalize longer-term incomes relative to base year 
incomes.  
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 Putting the preceding judgments together, any measure of equalization of longer-
term incomes relative to base-year incomes should: 
i) Be negative if the richest person gets richer, holding other incomes 
constant. 
ii) Be positive if the richest person gets poorer, holding other incomes 
constant. 
iii) Equal zero if the richest person 's and everybody else's incomes are 
unchanged. 
These three conditions are in fact the defining characteristics of a measure of mobility as 
an equalizer of longer-term incomes when only the richest person's income changes. 
These notions are generalized in Section 3 to changes in incomes of persons other than 
the richest. 
 The second column of Table 1 makes calculations similar to those of column (1) 
for the Gates-loses case. Comparing the two columns of Table 1, we see that none of the 
mobility measures in Table 1, or the concepts they represent, fulfills conditions i) – iii). 
Positional-movement measures are zero in both cases. Time-independence, share-
movement, and non-directional income movement measures are positive both for Gates-
gains and for Gates-loses, even though inequality rises when Gates gains and falls when 
Gates loses. Two measures change sign: the directional movement measure,  
(1/n) Σ (log y2i – log y1i), and mobility as welfare changes, which both go from being 
positive when Gates gains to being negative when Gates loses. Unfortunately, these sign 
changes are the exact opposite of what would be required by conditions i) – iii). 
We may conclude that these income mobility measures do not adequately 
distinguish between income change processes that equalize longer-term incomes and 
those that disequalize them. This criticism needs to be put in context: these other 
measures adequately measure the concepts they were designed to measure; what they do 
not adequately measure is this concept, viz., mobility as an equalizer of longer-term 
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incomes relative to base year incomes. This insensitivity is what motivates the 
development in this paper of a new class of measures – ones that do distinguish between 
equalizing and disequalizing mobility processes.   
Before proceeding, a remark is in order on the distinction between the notion of 
mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes, which is the concern here, versus the 
notion of mobility as an equalizer of opportunity, which is one way of looking at time-
independence (Bénabou and Ok, 2001). Consider the following example. Let there be a 
group of n identical individuals, each with the same base-year income, who pool their 
money into a winner-take-all lottery.. Assume that this is a fair lottery so that each 
participant has a one-n'th chance of winning. In the sense of equality of opportunity, 
establishing such a lottery is equalizing – in fact, perfectly equal – because final year 
income opportunities are equal ex ante for everyone. However, in the sense we are 
discussing here, the winner-take-all mobility process is disequalizing, because the 
average incomes before and after the lottery are more unequally distributed than were 
initial incomes. The distinction between mobility as an equalizer of ex ante opportunities 
and mobility as an equalizer of ex post outcomes is important; it is the latter that we will 
look at in what follows.  
 
3.  Indices of Mobility as Equalization of Longer-Term Incomes 
 3.1. Toward a New Class of Measures 
The properties of mobility measures have been formalized for many years starting 
with the work of Shorrocks (1978), King (1983), and Cowell (1985); these and other 
contributions are surveyed in Shorrocks (1993), Maasoumi (1998), and Fields and Ok 
(1999a).  In this section, I develop properties that would be desirable for a measure of 
mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes to possess and demonstrate a class of 
measures consistent with these properties. 
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As before, let denote the income of individual i in time period t. Let li  be a 
measure of the longer-term economic well-being of person i and let si be a measure of i's 
shorter-term economic well-being, with corresponding n-vectors l ≡ (l1 . . . ln ) and  
t
iy
s ≡ (s1 . . . sn ) in the population as a whole. I(l) and I(s) are measures of inequality of l and 
s respectively.  
If our interest were merely in ordinal comparisons – that is, whether mobility has 
been equalizing or disequalizing of longer-term incomes -- we could choose criteria for 
inequality comparisons such as the Lorenz criteria applied to the vectors l and s. Our 
concern, though, goes beyond that to the question of how equalizing or disequalizing is 
income mobility. For this question, cardinal indices are required.  
The crucial concept in what follows is an equalization function. This function, 
denoted El,s = E(I(l), I(s)) tells us how much more or less equal is the distribution of 
economic well-being in the long-term compared with economic well-being in the short-
term. Of course, it is the nature and extent of economic mobility that determines whether 
equalization or disequalization takes place over time. 
 
3.2. Specifying the Equalization Function  
The equalization function E(I(l), I(s)) is assumed to have the following properties 
  P1. Normalization. I(l) = I(s) ⇒ E(I(l), I(s)) = 0. 
  P2. Equalization. I(l) < I(s) ⇒ E(I(l), I(s)) > 0.  
  P3. Disqualization. I(l) > I(s) ⇒ E(I(l), I(s)) < 0.  
  P4. Greater Equalization. 
a. For two alternative l vectors l1, l2  ∈ L and a given vector s  ∈ S,  
 I(l1) < I(l2) < I(s) ⇒ Es, l1 > Es, l2 . 
b. For two alternative s vectors s1, s2  ∈ S and a given vector  l  ∈ L, 
 I(s1) > I(s2) > I(l) ⇒ Es1, l > Es2, l .  
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P5. Greater Disequalization. 
a. For two alternative l vectors l1, l2  ∈ L and a given vector s  ∈ S,  
 I(l1) > I(l2) > I(s) ⇒ Es, l1 < Es, l2 . 
b. For two alternative s vectors s1, s2  ∈ S and a given vector  l  ∈ L,  
 I(l) > I(s1) > I(s2) ⇒ Es2, l > Es1, l . 
What follows immediately from P1-P5 is that they imply that the equalization function 
E(I(l), I(s)) is 
a) decreasing in I(l), 
b) increasing in I(s), 
c) equal to zero when I(l) = I(s). 
 The class of mobility measures consistent with this class of equalization functions 
is very broad. What remains to be specified is i) how I(l) and I(s) are to be combined in 
the E(I(l), I(s)) function, ii) how long-term incomes l = (l1, . .  , ln) and short-term incomes  
s = (s1, . . . , sn) are to be defined, and iii) which inequality measure or measures are to be 
used.   
 
 3.3. Particularizing the Equalization Function 
The particular class of equalization indexes E used below makes the following 
additional judgments:  
          Combining I(l) and I(s). Let the function combining I(l) and I(s) be the 
ratio function. The ratio function accords with the judgment usually made in inequality 
analysis that inequality is relative.  By defining E(I(l), I(s)) as E
)
(I(l)/I(s)), we are able to 
impose the judgment that equalization also is relative.  Thus, there would be the same 
amount of equalization in (100, 200, 20000) → (100, 200, 10000) as there would be in 
(200, 400, 40000) → (200, 400, 20000). 
          Defining Short-Term Income.  Let the measure of short-term income s to 
be used be income in the base year. As already noted, this choice accords with standard 
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practice in economics of starting with an initial value (such as base year GNP) and then 
looking at the subsequent change in a variable of interest (such as economic growth). In 
order to specify which single year is to be used as the reference year, let us take, as in the 
examples above, the distribution of income in the first year as our reference period, as has 
been done, for example, by Chakravarty, Dutta, and Weymark (1985) and Ruiz-Castillo 
(2004). In this way, the mobility measure then tells us how the inequality of longer-term 
income compares with the inequality of first-year income, a natural choice given the 
propensity to frame discussions of change with reference to initial conditions. 
          Defining Long-Term Income.  Let long-term income l  be the mean of 
base-year income and final-year income. Simple averaging has a long history in 
economic analyses of longer-term economic well-being, going back to Friedman (1957) 
and also including Shorrocks (1978), Chakravarty, Dutta and Weymark (1985), 
Maasoumi and Zandvakili (1989), and Ruiz-Castillo (2004), among many others. 
Averaging is chosen here purely for convenience. The alternative to averaging is to 
follow the line of work of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), Maasoumi (1986), Tsui 
(1995), and Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) and build in a measure of long-term 
economic well-being l that incorporates imperfect substitutability. Maasoumi and 
Zandvakili (1990) calculate empirical mobility estimates using both simple averaging and 
imperfect substitutability. Lillard (1977) and Atkinson, Bourguignon, and Morrisson 
(1992) note the important role that capital markets play in justifying or failing to justify 
the use of averages. 
           Choosing an Inequality Measure.  Finally, let us choose a Lorenz-
consistent inequality measure such as the Gini coefficient or the Theil index.  This too is 
the established tradition in economics (Sen, 1973; Atkinson, 1983). 
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3.4. The Resultant Class of Indices   
Given these choices, the following class of measures of mobility as an equalizer 
of longer-term incomes is obtained: 
E  ≡  1 – (I(a) / I(y1)),  
where a is the vector of average incomes, y1 is the vector of base-year incomes, and I(.) is 
a Lorenz-consistent inequality measure such as the Gini coefficient or the Theil index. 
I(.) may also be additively decomposable, which the Theil index is and the Gini 
coefficient is not. The measure E is an index of equalization in the sense that a positive 
value indicates that average incomes a are more equally distributed than base-year 
incomes y1, a negative value indicates that a is less equally distributed than y1, and a zero 
value that a and y1 are distributed equally unequally. 
 
3.5.  The E Index Compared with the Chakravarty, Dutta, and Weymark 
Index 
The class of  equalization measures 
E   ≡  1 – (I(a) / I(y1))  
is equivalent to the family of mobility measures derived by Chakravarty, Dutta, and 
Weymark (1985):  
MCDW  ≡  (E(yagg)/E(y1)) - 1,  
where E(.) is an equality measure, yagg is aggregate income over the observation period, 
and y1 is income in the first period. However, CDW and I see the welfare economics of 
our indices differently from one another, for reasons to be explained in Section 5.   
Other differences between my view and CDW's, though less fundamental, are still 
noteworthy. One is that the concept I seek to measure is the extent to which mobility 
equalizes longer-term incomes relative to inequality in the first year and not relative to a 
hypothetical path. Another is that the class of indices they develop is an ethical one. By 
contrast, the class I derive in this paper is a descriptive one; in CDW's words, descriptive 
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indices "endeavor to measure some objective aspect of mobility." Their purpose, they 
say, is to supplement the descriptive approach, not supplant it. This distinction parallels 
the difference between Atkinson's (1970) "ethical" approach to inequality measurement 
as compared with Sen's (1973) "descriptive" approach.    
 
3.6. The E Index Compared with Shorrocks's MS. 
As noted above, Shorrocks (1978) conceptualized income mobility as the degree 
to which income equalization occurs as the observation period is lengthened. For 
Shorrocks, mobility is the opposite of rigidity, defined as follows. For the case of T 
annual observations on income, his rigidity index compares the inequality of T-period 
incomes with the inequality of single-period incomes. As above, let denote the income 
of individual i at time t and yt : =  be the vector of such incomes in the population. 
Similarly, let Yi : = to be the total income received by individual i over T periods 
and Y : =  be the distribution of these longer-term incomes. Shorrocks's rigidity 
index has in the numerator the inequality of T-period incomes using an inequality 
measure I(.), and in the denominator a weighted average of the inequalities in each year, 
with the weights being the ratio of the mean income in that year to the mean income over 
T years: 
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Shorrocks's mobility measure is then MS ≡ 1 – R. 
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Bénabou and Ok (2001) noted a feature of Shorrocks's measure which they regard 
as problematical and may strike other observers likewise: MS treats equalizing and 
disequalizing changes in essentially identical fashion. This point can be illustrated by 
calculating MS in the preceding examples, using the Gini coefficient as the index of 
inequality. The Gates-gains mobility process (100, 200, 20000) → (100, 200, 30000) 
produces a value for MS of 4.99 x 10-5, while the Gates-loses mobility process  
(100, 200, 20000) → (100, 200, 10000) produces the index value 5.91 x 10-5.  Naturally, 
had all incomes remained unchanged at (100, 200, 20000), MS would have been equal to 
zero. MS therefore ranks these three processes, in order of mobility, as: "Gates loses," 
then "Gates gains," and finally "no change."  Thus, neither the sign nor the relative 
magnitudes of MS conveys any information about whether the mobility process is an 
equalizing or a disequalizing one. This is because MS does not satisfy the preceding 
equalization properties.   
To repeat, Shorrocks's MS index was not intended to quantify the direction and the 
extent of the difference between the inequality of longer-term income and the inequality 
of base year income, so the fact that his index does not measure this difference is not a 
criticism of Shorrocks – I bring it up here merely to show how the MS index differs from 
the E index derived above. 
 
4.  Applications of the New Index  
In this section, three applications of the new equalization measure             
E ≡ 1 – (I(a) / I (y1)) shall be presented.  
The first is the application to the hypothetical situations of "Gates gains" and 
"Gates loses" presented above. All indices satisfying the equalization properties P1-P5 
including E = 1 – (I (a)/ I (y1), have a threshold value of zero, meaning that positive 
values signify that longer-term incomes are more equal than base-year incomes, while 
negative values signify the opposite. For the "Gates gains" mobility process  
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(100, 200, 20000) → (100, 200, 30000), the E index is equal to –3.9 x 10-3, while for the 
"Gates loses" process (100, 200, 20000) → (100, 200, 10000), the value of the index is 
+6.6 x 10-3. The change in sign of the E index from negative to positive clearly shows 
that the Gates-gains process is disequalizing while the Gates-loses process is equalizing. 
 As a second application, the E index is used to measure the extent to which five-
year income mobility has equalized the distribution of longer-term labor earnings in the 
United States. Building on prior work by Fields, Leary, and Ok (2000, 2002), for each 
five-year period between 1970 and 1995, base-year and final-year labor earnings 
(including overtime and bonuses) are drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
For each panel, the sample consists of men aged 25-60 in the base year who were not 
students, retired, or self-employed, and who had positive earnings in both years. Because 
the extent of labor earnings mobility may be sensitive to the particular base year and 
terminal year chosen, as a robustness check, calculations were made for each five-year 
period starting and ending a year earlier. For the U.S. case, the inequality index I(.) used 
in calculating E is the Gini coefficient. 
As shown in Table 2, two striking findings emerge from this initial exploration: 
(1) Five-year earnings mobility in the United States was equalizing in the 1970s but not 
in the 1980s and 1990s. This is a brand new finding: no other researcher, to the best of 
my knowledge, has shown that income mobility in the United States stopped equalizing 
longer-term incomes around 1980. This finding should be regarded as tentative and 
deserves to be subjected to sensitivity tests in future work. (2) Other mobility concepts 
using the same data are plotted in Table 3. We see that their time paths are entirely 
different from the time path of the E index. The indices used to gauge time-independence, 
positional movement, share movement, and non-directional income movement all show 
an inverted-U pattern, while directional income movement exhibits a wiggle which is 
always positive. Only the E index changes sign from positive to negative.  
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 The third application is to two-year earnings mobility in France. Buchinsky, 
Fields, Fougère, and Kramarz (2003) used data from employers' declarations of wages 
paid to each of their employees (Déclarations Annuelles de Salaires) to calculate the time 
paths of various indices of earnings mobility of full-time workers for two-year intervals 
from 1967-69 to 1995-97. In the French case, E is calculated using the Theil index for I(.) 
because of the authors’ collective preference for an additively decomposable inequality 
index.  
 Three principal findings were reached for France: (1) The E index for France, 
shown in Table 4, is never negative. Thus, in France, unlike the United States, income 
mobility has equalized longer-term incomes throughout the observation period. (2) The E 
index shares a U-shape with measures of many other mobility concepts in France (Table 
5). But: (3) Unlike many of the other U-shaped indices, the E-index attained its maximum 
in the most recent period. France is unlike the United States in this respect; in the U.S., 
mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes exhibits a quite different path from 
measures of other mobility concepts. 
These applications show that in practice as well as in theory, the concept of 
mobility-as-an-equalizer-of-longer-term-incomes is fundamentally different from other 
mobility concepts.  
 
5.  Using the Equalization Index in Social Welfare Judgments 
 Up to now, the principal contribution of this paper has been to derive a class of 
indices of a well-established but hitherto unmeasured aspect of income mobility: mobility 
as an equalizer of longer-term incomes relative to initial incomes. Now that this concept 
has a defensible measure – actually a broad class of such measures - the question can be 
asked, how much weight should this measure receive in social welfare judgments? 
Specifically, how much weight should be given to equalization relative to time-
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independence, positional movement, share movement, non-directional income 
movement, and directional income movement? 
 The answer is necessarily subjective depending on the preferences of the 
evaluator, but let me state mine. For me, an appealing social welfare function in a panel 
data context would be to regard economic well-being (W) as a positive function of the 
extent of directional income movement (Mdir) and of mobility as an equalizer of longer-
term incomes relative to initial incomes (E): 
W = f(Mdir, E) , ΔW/Δmdir > 0, ΔW/Δ E > 0. (1) 
The positive weight given to directional income movement can be thought of as an 
economist’s preference for efficiency, while the positive weight given to equalization can 
be thought of as an economist’s preference for equity. 
The efficiency judgment  ΔW/Δmdir > 0 in (1) takes us beyond the bounds of this 
paper. However, the equity judgment ΔW/Δ E > 0  bears further scrutiny.  
Atkinson (1980) and Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) argued explicitly for the 
ethical case in favor of a more equal distribution of longer-term incomes. Let an 
evaluator adopt a social valuation function whereby the social valuation of recipient i's 
income in period j is a decreasing function of i's income in period k – that is, the higher is 
the recipient's income in one year, the lower is the marginal value of a given income 
amount in the other year. Thus, letting  and  denote base-year and final-year income 
respectively, in the two period case,   with V12 < 0.  It follows that for given 
marginal distributions of base-year incomes  
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 Shorrocks (1978) reached a similar conclusion. He wrote: “If two societies have 
identical income distributions in each year, then social welfare will be greater for the 
society which exhibits more mobility.” What Shorrocks favored was more mobility 
within a given structure of single-year distributions. What he was silent about, and what 
social welfare function (1) addresses explicitly, is how to consider mobility which 
involves a change in the structure itself, as in the Gates-gains and Gates-loses cases. 
 Two objections can be raised to social welfare function (1). The first is that it has 
too much in it. The second is that it has too little. 
 Let us start with the view that (1) contains too much. Above, I noted that the 
equalization index E developed in this paper and the Chakravarty-Dutta-Weymark index 
MCDW  are essentially equivalent from a purely positive point of view. A referee has 
helpfully pointed out that the precise relationship between them is E(y1 --> y2) =  
[(1 – I(y1))/I(y1)] MCDW (y1 --> y2) . Because I(y1)is an inequality index, which like the 
Gini is usually normed so that it falls between zero and one, I(y1) is expected to be less 
than one. Therefore [(1 – I(y1))/I(y1)] is always positive and MCDW (y1 --> y2) and  
E(y1 --> y2) always have the same sign. Hence, when mobility equalizes (disequalizes) 
longer-term incomes, MCDW (y1 --> y2) evaluates the process positively (negatively) 
regardless of growth.  
My normative view is quite different from CDW’s. In their words (p. 1): "Ethical 
indices of income mobility measure the change in welfare resulting from mobility. The 
concept of mobility we explore consists of a welfare comparison between the actual time 
path of the income distribution with a hypothetical time path obtained by supposing that 
starting from the actual first-period distribution, the remaining income receipts exhibit 
complete immobility." CDW's domain D is the positive orthant. This domain is not 
restricted to distributions with the same marginal distributions or the same mean, and 
indeed CDW explicitly allow the mean income to change. But when the mean changes, 
"the change in welfare resulting from mobility" should, in my judgment, depend on the 
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direction and amount by which the mean changes and not just on whether the mobility is 
equalizing or disequalizing. CDW say (p. 8): "Socially desirable mobility is associated 
with income structures having positive index values while socially undesirable mobility 
is associated with income structures having negative index values." In effect, then, their 
social welfare function is 
 W =g(MCDW) ,  ΔW/ΔMCDW > 0. (2) 
Note the omission of the directional movement component as compared with (1).  
The welfare function (2) gives a clear verdict: it evaluates the Gates-gains process 
(100, 200, 20000) → (100, 200, 30000) negatively and the Gates-loses process  
(100, 200, 20000) → (100, 200, 10000) positively. Such evaluations are in direct 
contradiction to the quasi-Paretian welfare judgment, viz., that an increase in one income, 
holding other incomes constant, raises social welfare. While ethical judgments are in the 
eyes of the evaluator, in my view, the CDW welfare judgment gives too much ethical 
weight to the disequalizing aspect of the pattern of income growth and too little to the 
fact that income has grown when Gates gains and contracted when Gates loses.  
Other observers might object to (1) for the opposite reason: that the function 
should also include measures of time-independence, positional movement, share 
movement, or non-directional income movement as additional arguments. I have not 
included these as arguments in my own social welfare judgments because these 
considerations do not have any obvious welfare content for me. This is because I can 
think of reasons why an increase in time-independence, positional movement, share 
movement, or non-directional income movement could be given positive social welfare 
weight and others why they might be given negative social welfare weight. 
Readers are encouraged to think carefully about what social welfare functions 
they want to use and then measure those aspects of income mobility that are of greatest 
concern to them. What I have tried to highlight in this section is that a reasonable case 
can be made that our welfare judgments should include mobility as an equalizer of 
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longer-term incomes relative to initial incomes as one of the arguments in a social 
welfare function. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper has made five points. First, a well-established concept in the income 
mobility literature is the notion of mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes 
relative to base-year incomes. Second, although the mobility measures in common use 
measure other mobility concepts, they do not adequately measure this one. Third, a set of 
axioms has been formulated leading to a class of indices of mobility as an equalizer of 
longer-term incomes, one easily-implementable subclass of which is the equalization 
index E = 1 – (I(a)/I(y1), where I(a) and I(y1) are respectively the inequality of average 
income and of base-year income. The new index is similar to one existing mobility index 
though its use is different, and different from other indices. Fourth, in empirical work for 
the United States and France, the E index makes a fundamental qualitative difference. 
The new findings here are that income mobility equalized longer-term earnings among 
U.S. men in the 1970s but not in the 1980s or 1990s, whereas in France, income mobility 
has always been equalizing since first measured in the late 1960s, and furthermore the 
degree of equalization is higher in more recent years than it ever was before. Fifth and 
finally, the equalization index E deserves consideration as one component of an 
observer’s social welfare function. 
The concept of mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes is an old one, 
complementing mobility-as-time-independence, positional movement, share movement, 
non-directional income movement, and directional income movement. Mobility analysts 
would do well to be careful to specify which of these concepts are of greatest interest to 
them and to choose the mobility indices they use accordingly.  
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Table 1. 
Measures of Six Mobility Concepts When Longer-Term Incomes are Disequalized 
and When They Are Equalized. 
 
Measure Disequalizing Process: 
The richest person gains 50% 
(100, 200, 20000) → 
(100, 200, 30000) 
("Gates Gains") 
(1) 
 
Equalizing Process: 
The richest person loses 50%  
(100, 200, 20000) → 
(100, 200, 10000) 
("Gates Loses") 
(2) 
 
 
(a) Time-independence, as measured by 1-r(y1, y2), 
where r is the Pearson correlation coefficient 
 
 1.068 x 10-6 
 
9.808 x 10-6 
(b) Positional-movement, as measured by  
1-ρ(y1, y2), where ρ is the rank correlation 
coefficient 
0 0 
(c) Per-capita share movement, as measured by  
(1/n) Σ |s(y2i) – s(y1i)|, where s(.) denotes i's share of 
total income 
3.252x10-3 9.565x10-3 
(d) Per-capita non-directional income movement, as 
measured by (1/n) Σ |y2i – y1i| 
3333.3 3333.3 
(e) Per-capita directional income movement, as 
measured by  (1/n) Σ (log y2i – log y1i) 
0.135 -0.231 
(f) Mobility as welfare change Positive for any welfare function that is 
increasing in all incomes 
Negative for any welfare function that is 
increasing in all incomes 
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 Table 2. 
 Mobility as Equalization in the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
 1970-1975 to 1990-1995 and 1969-1974 to 1989-1994,  
 Measuring Equalization as E = 1 – (G(a)/G(y1). 
 
 
Period Value of E Period Value of E 
1970-1975 .008 1969-1974 .014 
1975-1980 .020 1974-1979 .038 
1980-1985 -.006 1979-1984 -.015 
1985-1990 -.018 1984-1989 -.006 
1990-1995 .004 1989-1994 -.005 
 
 
   
E-Measure in Each of Five Periods         E-Measure in Each of Five Periods 
     1970-75 to 1990-95            1969-74 to 1989-94 
                       (Base Year Indicated in the Graph)               (Base Year Indicated in the Graph) 
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
69 74 79 84 89
           
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
70 75 80 85 90
 
 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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Table 3.
Time Paths of Measures of Other Mobility Concepts
in the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
1970-1975 to 1990-1995
(Base Year Indicated in the Graphs)
Concept Measure Time Path
Positional Movement
Mean absolute centile change
Centile mobility ratio
One minus centile
correlation coefficient
Share Movement
Mean absolute share change
Shorrocks's M(Gini)
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
70 75 80 85 90
0.0
0.2
0.4
70 75 80 85 90
10
12
14
16
70 75 80 85 90
0.0
0.2
0.4
70 75 80 85 90
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
70 75 80 85 90
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Concept Measure Time Path
Non-Directional Income Movement
          A. In dollars F-O 1
          B. In log-dollars F-O 2
Directional Income Movement
          A. In dollars Per-capita growth
           B. In log-dollars F-O 3
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
70 75 80 85 90
0.0
0.2
0.4
70 75 80 85 90
0
1000
2000
3000
70 75 80 85 90
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
70 75 80 85 90
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IV. Time-Independence
          A. Of income One minus correlation
of earnings
          B. Of ranks One minus rank
correlation coefficient
Sou
Negative chi-square
in deciles
rce: Fields, Leary, and Ok (2000)
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
70 75 80 85 90
0.0
0.1
70 75
0.2
0.3
80 85 90
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
0
70 75 80 85 90
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Table 4. 
Mobility as Equalization in the French Déclarations Annuelles de Salaires, 
1967-69 to 1995-97, 
Measuring Equalization as E = 1 – (G(a)/G(y1). 
 
Period Value of P Period Value of P 
1968-1970 0.040 1967-1969 0.040 
1973-1975 0.031 1972-1974 0.032 
1978-1980 0.030 1977-1979 0.036 
1983-1985 0.008* 1982-1984 0.018 
1988-1990 0.012* 1987-1989 0.002 
1993-1995 0.054 1992-1994 0.021 
 
 
Evolution of E-Measure, 1967-69 to 1995-97 
(Base Year Indicated in the Graph) 
 
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992
 
 
Source: Buchinsky, Fields, Fougère, and Kramarz (2003). 
                                                          
* P-Value interpolated from adjacent years due to missing data.  
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Table 5. 
Time Paths of Measures of Other Mobility Concepts 
in the French Déclarations Annuelles de Salaires, 
1967-69 to 1995-97.  
(Base Year Indicated in the Graphs) 
Concept  Measure   Time Path    
     
Positional Movement   
             
  Mean absolute centile change   
     
     
     
     
7
8
9
10
67 72 77 82 87 92
 
 Share Movement              
  Mean absolute share change   
     
     
     
     
     
     
0.1
0.15
0.2
67 72 77 82 87 92
 
Non-Directional Income Movement     
In log-dollars      
     
     
     
     
     
     
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
67 72 77 82 87 92
 
Directional Income Movement     
In log-dollars     
     
     
     
     
     
0
0.1
0.2
67 72 77 82 87 92
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Time-Independence       
 Of ranks 
Negative chi-square  
in deciles   
 
 
 
    
     
-3
-2.5
-2
67 72 77 82 87 92
   
 
Source: Buchinsky, Fields, Fougère, and Kramarz (2003) 
 
